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ABSTRACT
Epigenetic markers could potentially be used for risk 
assessment in risk- stratified population- based cancer 
screening programmes. Whereas current screening 
programmes generally aim to detect existing cancer, 
epigenetic markers could be used to provide risk 
estimates for not- yet- existing cancers. Epigenetic risk- 
predictive tests may thus allow for new opportunities 
for risk assessment for developing cancer in the future. 
Since epigenetic changes are presumed to be modifiable, 
preventive measures, such as lifestyle modification, 
could be used to reduce the risk of cancer. Moreover, 
epigenetic markers might be used to monitor the 
response to risk- reducing interventions. In this article, 
we address ethical concerns related to personal 
responsibility raised by epigenetic risk- predictive tests in 
cancer population screening. Will individuals increasingly 
be held responsible for their health, that is, will they 
be held accountable for bad health outcomes? Will 
they be blamed or subject to moral sanctions? We will 
illustrate these ethical concerns by means of a Europe- 
wide research programme that develops an epigenetic 
risk- predictive test for female cancers. Subsequently, we 
investigate when we can hold someone responsible for 
her actions. We argue that the standard conception of 
personal responsibility does not provide an appropriate 
framework to address these concerns. A different, 
prospective account of responsibility meets part of 
our concerns, that is, concerns about inequality of 
opportunities, but does not meet all our concerns about 
personal responsibility. We argue that even if someone is 
responsible on grounds of a negative and/or prospective 
account of responsibility, there may be moral and 
practical reasons to abstain from moral sanctions.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, efforts have been made to 
transform medicine from reactive—acting on symp-
toms with medical care and/or treatment—to a 
healthcare approach that is referred to as P4 Medi-
cine: preventive, predictive, personalised and partic-
ipatory.1 Currently, international and European 
consortia are engaged in research aligned with the 
vision of P4 Medicine. Advances in computational 
and biomedical sciences allow for the development 
of omics- based tests. Based on the characterisation 
of sets of biological molecules such as DNA, RNA, 
epigenetic mechanisms, proteins, microbes and 
metabolites, ‘omics’-based tests could be used to 
predict the risks of individuals for specific diseases 
such as cancer and dementia.1 Among the ‘omics’ 
disciplines, epigenomics, in particular, has emerged 
as a promising field.2 3 Epigenomics is the study 
of the complete set of epigenetic modifications 
in a cell. Epigenetics refers to molecular mecha-
nisms that affect the regulation of gene expression 
without altering the DNA sequence.4
Epigenomics has three morally relevant distin-
guishing features. First, epigenetic changes may 
result from environmental exposures, for example, 
pollution, (early life) stress, physical exercise, diet 
and smoking.5 Consequently, epigenetic data may 
potentially reveal sensitive information about a 
person’s past lifestyle and exposures. Second, it is, 
in part, hereditary: epigenetic modifications can 
be passed on to next generation(s).i Finally, unlike 
genetic mutations, epigenetics may change over 
time and is, in theory, modifiable or reversible; 
epigenetic changes may be modulated, for example, 
by diet, drugs, healthy behaviour and other envi-
ronmental factors.6
One of the best- studied epigenetic mechanisms 
is DNA methylation, a process in which methyl 
groups are added to parts of the DNA thereby 
affecting transcription.7 New assays developed for 
the identification of markers of DNA methylation 
can provide insight into its role in the pathogenesis 
of cancer—through silencing of tumour suppressor 
genes and/or activation of oncogenes8—and other 
diseases. Also, they can be used in (more precise) 
diagnosing or staging of cancer types and person-
alised treatment. Furthermore, as epigenetic 
markers may indicate one’s future risk of developing 
certain types of cancer, epigenetic tests may be used 
in screening of healthy individuals. Epigenetic risk- 
predictive cancer tests could thus be implemented 
in public health settings to improve population- 
based screening programmes.ii
Implementation of epigenetic risk- predictive 
cancers tests in population- based screening (in 
short, epigenetic screening) raises ethical concerns, 
ranging from issues involving the feasibility of 
informed consent (eg, the capacity of citizens to 
understand complex information about risks for 
multiple diseases)9 to issues related to big data 
i More studies are needed to confirm the transgener-
ational effect.39 We will not discuss the transgenera-
tional effect since our focus is on the implementation 
of epigenetic screening and personal responsibility.
ii Epigenetic mechanisms also play a role in other 
diseases and contexts (eg, the potential transmis-
sion of epigenetic risks from parent to child and on 
the child’s future health, see M’hamdi).40
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and privacy10 and to medicalisation and reconceptualisation 
of disease.11 12 iii In this paper, we focus on a different issue: 
the effects of introducing epigenetic screening on the tendency 
within societies to hold individuals responsible for their health, 
potentially leading to blaming the victim, stigmatisation and 
discrimination.12–16 By personal responsibility, we mean: a 
responsibility for which an individual might be held accountable 
in the sense of being treated differently and/or blamed and/or in 
the allocation of healthcare resources.
This is one of the major ethical concerns discussed in the liter-
ature on advances in epigenetics. May individuals increasingly be 
held responsible for their health now that technology increases 
opportunities to reduce cancer risks? Ought we hold individuals 
accountable if they are known to have a high risk of cancer but 
do not change their lifestyle nor comply with the offered person-
alised screening interventions? Are healthcare professionals 
allowed (or obliged) to steer these individuals or put them under 
pressure (eg, using praise or blame) to change their lifestyle or 
undergo screening or preventive measures? Is it morally accept-
able if these individuals have to pay higher health premiums or 
to exclude them from reimbursement through collective funds?
In order to discuss these questions, we introduce a case study 
of potential implementation of epigenetic risk- predictive female 
cancer tests in the context of a population- based screening 
programme. Next, we provide an inventory of the ethical 
concerns related to personal responsibility raised by epigenetic 
screening. Subsequently, we argue that the standard model of 
personal responsibility may not provide sufficient ethical guid-
ance in how to deal with these concerns and an institutional 
account of responsibility may provide a promising approach. 
Finally, we draw attention to a number of points to consider 
in the responsible implementation of epigenetic screening, that 
result from our analysis of ethical concerns regarding personal 
responsibility.
Epigenetic risk-predictive female cancer screening as a case 
study
Currently, a research consortium ‘Female cancer prediction 
using cervical omics to individualise screening and prevention’ 
(FORECEE) is examining how epigenetic tests may be imple-
mented for risk stratification in nationwide cancer population 
screening programmes. FORECEE is developing a multiomics 
risk- prediction tool to predict women’s risk of four female 
cancers—ovarian, breast, endometrial and cervical—using 
cervical cells based on epigenetic, genetic and microbiome 
markers.4 iv Whereas current cancer screening programmes, in 
general, aim to detect existing cancer (eg, breast cancer by using 
mammography), omics markers could be used to provide risk 
estimates for not- yet- existing cancers. Multiomics test would 
provide for new opportunities for risk assessment for developing 
multiple cancers in the future. Based on the results, a woman’s 
risk for breast, ovarian, endometrial and cervical cancers can 
be classified into risk groups, for example, low, intermediate 
iii Medicalisation: due to epigenetic screening a normal healthy 
state and experiences (stress, eating patterns and so on) or an 
at- risk state may be perceived, experienced and monitored (by 
individuals themselves and others) as a potential disease state. 
An example of overdiagnosis is ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS). 
See Hofmann’s article on the distinction between medicalisation 
and overdiagnoses and the P4 systems medicine.41
iv Methylation tests are not yet in clinical use, and the risk- 
prediction tool of the project Female cancer prediction using 
cervical omics to individualise screening and prevention 
(FORECEE) is still in marker discovery phase.
or high. Personalised advice can be offered regarding screening 
eligibility, start and stop age, and frequency and modality of 
screening, in other words, a risk- stratified screening approach.17
Implementation of nationwide epigenetic risk- predictive 
population- based cancer screening programmes may have 
important advantages. Because of its preventive and risk- 
stratified approach, it may reduce overdiagnosis and overtreat-
ment, and hence improve the efficacy of existing early detection 
population screening programmes (for example, breast cancer 
screening).17 v Epigenetic risk- predictive population- based 
cancer screening as such can promote individual autonomy by 
providing information about an individual’s cancer risk and 
offer options regarding the frequency of screening and preven-
tive management.9 18
However, implementation of epigenetic screening also raises 
ethical concerns related to personal responsibility. Some authors 
indicate that discussing such ethical issues may be premature 
given the current limited scientific evidence of the clinical utility 
of epigenetic tests for risk stratification.10 16 Also, it could be 
argued that these issues are not exactly new and occur in other 
screening tests for modifiable (eg, lifestyle) risk factors, such 
as obesity and smoking status, as well. Given the increasing 
research activity on epigenetic risk- predictive cancer tests 
and the special salience of epigenetic data, a discussion of the 
question of its impact on the notion of personal responsibility 
is timely. We do not mean to suggest that epigenetics data are 
essentially different, unique or exceptional,16 or even that they 
will be more informative about individuals’ risks of developing 
cancer than are other biomarkers or lifestyle factors. The clinical 
validity and utility of epigenetic data may be overestimated and 
their promises may not pan out. However, there are differences 
between epigenetic data and other types of data that are worth 
exploring in the context of moral responsibility.
Epigenetic biomarkers are different from other types of 
biomarkers in that they reflect the combined effects of a person’s 
genetic background and environmental exposures on their health 
status. Epigenetic biomarkers may thus explain why in some indi-
viduals, for example, obesity or smoking or other exposures will 
result in an increased risk of specific cancers, and why in other 
individuals, the same lifestyles or exposures will not. Further, 
unlike genetic changes, epigenetic changes are presumed to be 
modifiable, which opens opportunities for preventive measures 
such as lifestyle changes to restore the risk status to a normal 
state and thus lower the individual’s risk of cancer.19 20 More-
over, epigenetic biomarkers may enable monitoring of the 
effects of risk- reducing measures.4 Individuals could therefore 
be informed about personalised preventive options, including 
lifestyle adaptations, that may work to reverse epigenetic modi-
fications and improve risk status.21
v Overdiagnosis is defined as ‘a diagnosis of a condition in a(n 
asymptomatic) person where the diagnosis does not produce 
a net benefit for that person’.41 In other words, abnormalities 
detected by screening that meet the definition of cancer but 
will never lead to cancer symptoms in the expected patient’s 
lifetime. Overdiagnosis can lead to overtreatment, for example, 
chemotherapy or surgery that provide the patient with no 
survival benefit but with adverse side effects. Modelling studies 
have shown that the probability of overdiagnosis is lower in 
the higher risk groups. Subsequently, risk stratification and 
targeting screening to higher risk groups would reduce overdiag-
nosis.42 43Hofmann points out that overdiagnosis still exists as a 
problem in preventive screening. When can a precursor believed 
to contribute to cancer correctly be defined as (pre)cancer?44
4300.7802.430. P
rotected by copyright.
 on D
ecem
ber 8, 2020 at E
rasm
us M
edical / X
51
http://jm
e.bm
j.com
/
J M
ed E
thics: first published as 10.1136/m
edethics-2020-106146 on 18 N
ovem
ber 2020. D
ow
nloaded from
 
3Bolt I, et al. J Med Ethics 2020;0:1–6. doi:10.1136/medethics-2020-106146
Original research
Reasons for concern regarding personal responsibility
In theory, epigenetic tests implemented in population- based 
screening may provide a real- time understanding of one’s risk 
status, and a clearly visible (traceable) relationship between life-
style factors and (risk of) disease. This very aspect could motivate 
people to adopt a healthy lifestyle and make use of preventive 
interventions. It is, as of yet, unclear whether people (will) in 
fact do so based on epigenetic risk information; the effect of 
epigenetic risk- predictive testing for cancer risk on the motiva-
tion of individuals to adjust their lifestyle has not been studied. 
However, research into the effect of communication of DNA- 
based (ie, genomic or genetic) disease risk estimation shows no 
or only a small effect on risk- reducing behaviour.22–24 Similarly, 
it is questionable whether offering epigenetic cancer risk infor-
mation in itself will motivate people to adopt healthy lifestyles. 
Although, in theory, a high- risk score might be lowered by life-
style adaptations because of the reversible nature of DNA meth-
ylation, changing one’s lifestyle is not as simple as it seems, and 
simpler for some than it is for others.
This concern applies, in particular, to individuals with low 
health literacy skills. Health literacy consists of four competen-
cies: the ability to gather, understand, appraise and apply health 
information.25 Research shows that socioeconomic status is 
associated with health literacy.26 27 Limited health literacy has 
a negative impact on health outcomes and service use.26 When 
epigenetic tests identify (elevated) risk status, groups with a low 
socioeconomic status and limited health literacy may not be able 
to adjust their lifestyle. Hence, they will not reap the potential 
benefits of screening and may even be held accountable for loss of 
health because of inability to adjust their lifestyle. This, however, 
would be unfair. Thus, not only it is unclear whether screening 
will bring benefit (by leading to healthier lifestyles), any poten-
tial benefit to be obtained may also be unequally distributed.
Another concern arises when individuals do possess sufficient 
health literacy skills, opportunities to reduce risk are available 
and obstructive factors are non- existent, and may thus become 
or be held responsible. This occurs, for example, if adequate 
programmes were offered to support adaptation of healthy 
behaviour but some individuals with a high risk knowingly and 
deliberately refrain from a more intense screening regime and/
or healthy lifestyles and prevention management. A recent study 
into attitudes of European women towards predictive epigen-
etic risk testing showed that women were generally receptive 
about epigenetic screening, with the tests’ potential for preven-
tion, management and lifestyle changes to be the main reason 
in favour of the test. Additionally, an increase of (unnecessary) 
worry about cancer and coercion into the adoption of a healthy 
lifestyle and healthcare interventions were the main reasons of 
the surveyed women to disfavour these tests.28 Participation 
in current cancer screening programmes is optional. Although 
voluntariness should (and will likely) continue to be a formal 
criterion for responsible screening, non- participation might in 
the future in both screening for risk as screening for disease 
elicit ‘blaming the victim’ (blaming individuals for their health 
problems), stigmatisation (eg, in daily social interactions, in 
condemnatory language by healthcare professionals) and/or 
discrimination (eg, unjust exclusion or hindrances of access 
to social arrangements, reimbursement of healthcare costs, 
disability and life insurance and so on). In light of the potential 
visible and traceable relationship between lifestyle and cancer 
risk and the reversibility of epigenetic cancer risk, the introduc-
tion of epigenomics in population screening may exacerbate 
these ethical concerns.
Finally, there is a tension between the broader societal shift 
to personal responsibility of individuals for their own health 
and one of the distinguishing features of epigenetics, namely the 
effects of environmental factors on epigenetic processes.12 14 15 29 
Who ought to be held responsible for the detrimental effects on a 
person’s health caused by environmental pollution or unhealthy 
work- conditions? For healthcare systems, it may be easier and 
more efficient to treat the detrimental health effects in individual 
patients than to tackle environmental causal factors. The setting 
up of epigenetic screening programmes offering personalised 
risk information and offering prevention management may rein-
force a one- sided focus on personal responsibility,12 14 directing 
attention away from (possibly equally important) societal factors 
for ill health.
Beyond ‘personalised’ responsibility
How to determine whether a person is responsible for an action 
or an omission in the sense for which an individual might be 
held accountable? The following aspects have been discussed 
as important within the standard model of responsibility in the 
context of healthcare: the conditions of knowledge, causality 
and control or voluntariness.14 30 31vi According to the standard 
model, an individual should have access to relevant informa-
tion, be aware of a causal relationship between behaviour and 
effect, and free to act as they did (in the absence of controlling 
influences).14 If these conditions are met, a person may be held 
accountable for their choices and/or actions, and may be treated 
differently and/or blamed.
Personal responsibility has often been interpreted and applied 
as a retrospective or backward- looking notion: ‘when, under 
what conditions, is it proper to blame someone for a certain 
action or a certain outcome?’32 To attribute retrospective 
responsibility is equivalent to holding someone accountable for 
something. Applying retrospective responsibility in the context 
of epigenetic screening would amount to the question whether 
the conditions of knowledge/awareness, causality and voluntari-
ness have been fulfilled.14 Suppose that an epigenetic test indeed 
would be able to show that past behaviour and lifestyle of an 
individual have led to an increased risk of cancer: should we 
hold that person responsible for their increased risk? It seems the 
answer should be ‘yes’, if he/she were aware of the consequences 
of her lifestyle, his/her lifestyle is causally related to a significant 
degree to cancer risk and his/her health behaviour was not deter-
mined by controlling influences.
Several authors, however, argued that applying a retrospective 
responsibility raises serious problems. First of all, it is difficult 
and perhaps even impossible to identify causality; the complex 
correlations between lifestyle, environmental factors and epigen-
etic markers, and their causal role in contributing to a specific 
type of cancer (risk) are yet to be proven.14 Moreover, epigenetic 
changes may also be due to the internal cellular environment and 
implicate genetic variations. Disentangling the precise causal role 
of individual lifestyle- related, genetic and environmental factors 
in the aetiology of disease is currently not (yet) feasible.33 For 
example, a specific epigenetic marker could have been triggered 
by in utero exposure to a certain toxin and the same marker 
could have also been triggered by voluntarily getting exposed to 
this toxin as an adult. Second, it is difficult to establish whether 
someone has had sufficient control over her behaviour and life-
style.30 34 Are unhealthy eating and living patterns caused by 
vi This conception is in line with what Nicole Vincent classifies as 
outcome responsibility and what Fischer and Ravizza call moral 
responsibility.45
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a voluntary, well- considered choice or by poverty and/or lack 
of health literacy and capabilities? It is hardly possible to trace 
whether unhealthy lifestyles are the result of well- considered, 
voluntary choices or are driven by structural socioeconomic 
factors or, more likely, a mixture of both. With its focus on 
causality and the individual, a retrospective concept of moral 
responsibility may create a tendency to neglect or overlook 
structural factors.12 14
A prospective or forward- looking account of responsibility 
has thus been proposed to avoid the above- mentioned prob-
lems.14 30 Whereas retrospective responsibility relates to what we 
have done or neglected to do in the past and integrates causality 
with culpability and blame, prospective responsibility focusses 
on the question who is supposed to do what in the (near) future, 
for example, change health behaviour or pay a higher health 
insurance premium.35 vii To attribute prospective responsibility 
to someone is comparable to saying that he/she has a moral 
obligation or duty to, for example, maintain a healthy lifestyle. 
Whereas retrospective responsibility tends to overlook structural 
factors, prospective responsibility, on the other hand, empha-
sises those factors by asking the question: ‘who is capable of 
doing something about it?’ This is an essential aspect of (moral) 
responsibility. Before individuals can be held responsible, they 
should be enabled to become responsible.30 From this point of 
view, one could argue that other parties than individuals—cor-
porations, international organisations, governmental bodies and 
the state—are more able to deal with factors harmful to human 
health. Moreover, governmental bodies and the state should 
support those groups with less health literacy skills to become 
capable of attaining a healthy lifestyle. Prospective responsibility 
therefore meets our concerns about inequality of opportunities.
However, prospective responsibility does not meet all our 
concerns. What if someone voluntarily and deliberately chooses 
not to participate in epigenetic screening? Or, what if she takes 
the test, identified to be at high- risk but does not want to take 
the advised preventive measures? Are moral sanctions, such as 
resentment and blame, justified in these cases? Should we hold 
her responsible and keep her from using collectively funded 
healthcare resources? The answer might be in the affirmative 
if we reason from prospective responsibility. After all, if she has 
the knowledge, skills and adequate support, and thus is really 
capable of making decisions and adjusting her health behaviour, 
we may argue that she has an obligation to be healthy, supple-
mented by blame and/or sanctions.
Individuals may refuse screening or preventive interventions 
based on their view on the good life: for example, they may not 
consider health to be the most important value in their lives. 
These persons may therefore have made an autonomous deci-
sion not to participate in screening and prevention. Within both 
a retrospective and a prospective understanding of personal 
responsibility, these people can be held responsible for the 
adverse outcomes of their lifestyle choices. While these people 
are responsible, this does not imply that we are justified in 
treating them differently, for example, to blame them, to apply 
pressure, to increase the premium on his/her insurance company 
for life insurance or the standard health insurance package, or 
as an extreme measure, to exclude him/her from healthcare 
insurance.36 There may be good reasons to abstain from moral 
sanctioning of people even if they fulfil the conditions of the 
vii Retrospective responsibility (to be held accountable) might 
be imposed if an individual/a party failed to discharge their 
prospective responsibility. But also here causality as a condition 
should be fulfilled. See also Dupras et al15 and Van der Poel.32
retrospective and/or prospective notion of responsibility. There 
are (at least two) valid reasons to not impose sanctions.
First, in pluralistic and democratic societies, it is generally 
acknowledged that citizens should be free to develop ways of 
life in accordance with their (differing) personal values. After all, 
people hold different views of the good life. This might imply 
that people should be able to develop a way of life in which 
health is not the most important value. As Verweij states, holding 
a view to take life as it comes is not irrational:
in a pluralistic and democratic society, it is undesirable if particular 
reasonable ways of life cannot flourish. It is not irrational for a 
person ‘just to live her life’ and only bother about her health if she 
would feel ill or if there are apparent and clear risks. Yet the more 
one is confronted with offers of screening and preventive care, the 
more difficult it is to develop and sustain such an attitude.37
Moreover, when there is a trade- off of pros and cons as is 
the case for population- based screening, respect for autonomy 
is essential. Society can only be pluralistic if it remains possible 
to choose other ways of life. If certain lifestyles are sanctioned, 
a voluntary choice is more difficult to make.30 It may become 
difficult to sustain a life in which one only bothers about one’s 
health when one falls ill, if one is punished for this lifestyle, for 
example, by being withheld from basic healthcare when one 
does fall ill. When it becomes (too) costly (or dangerous) to live 
one’s life according to one’s values, one’s autonomy is violated. 
Genuine freedom presupposes solidarity (in the sense of access 
to (collectively funded) basic healthcare).
Second, how individuals should be treated is not simply 
and solely dependent on the question whether an individual 
is personally responsible (ie, they were knowledgeable and in 
control) but in the end is determined by the values and purposes 
of societal institutions. In a welfare state, citizens have collective 
duties based on the values and purposes of societal institutions; 
in this case of healthcare institutions and medicine, it is the moral 
obligation of the healthcare system to care for the sick. It would 
be tantamount to cruelty to not treat people who suffer from 
illnesses even if they have led unhealthy lifestyles that in all like-
lihood have contributed to a disease. People who have refused 
to be vaccinated against measles are treated nonetheless when 
they become infected. People who suffer from diseases caused by 
smoking, sexual transmitted diseases or accidents by wearing no 
helmets are treated when they fall ill or become injured.viii This 
is not a justification for their unhealthy behaviour or a denial of 
some form of responsibility; it is what a civilised society does 
when confronted with human suffering. This reasoning is in 
line with what Mounk calls the institutional account of respon-
sibility. “In deciding what kind of expectations to place on our 
fellow citizens, we need to decide about the goals the institution 
of responsibility is meant to serve: What values do ascriptions of 
responsibility further? What is their relative priority? And how 
might our decision to place, or not place particular expectations 
on citizens incentivise actions that are conducive or detrimental 
to those values?”(36:194) Healthcare as an institution is set up 
to serve certain values deemed important in society. Meeting 
healthcare needs is valued because health is necessary to partic-
ipate in communities and society, to pursue a career, to realise 
one’s ambitions and so on. Whether or not and which type of 
viii Whether, for example, a higher premium is justified may be 
answered by asking whether following an unhealthy lifestyle 
amounts to an unreasonable risk. This approach is suggested by 
Julian Savulescu.30
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moral sanctions are justified is dependent on the purposes and 
values of healthcare which may also include ‘practical reasons’ 
(eg, after all, moral sanctions may sometimes exacerbate diseases 
and increase costs).
The standard model of responsibility thus falls short when 
determining what sanctions are morally acceptable. The justi-
fiability of moral sanctions is not determined by the attribution 
of (either a retrospective or a prospective notion of) responsi-
bility, but is constrained by other values held within societies, 
such as autonomy on the one hand and meeting healthcare needs 
on the other hand. Even if a person can be held responsible 
(prospectively or retrospectively), it may still not be acceptable 
to impose moral sanctions. To determine the moral acceptability 
of sanctions, moral and practical considerations are important, 
including the type or level of moral sanctions.
A more promising approach may be the institutional account of 
responsibility, which places the onus of responsibility for health 
on institutions rather than individuals and fits with epigenetics. 
Epigenetic information may help to identify societal or institu-
tional causes of ill health and shift responsibility for health from 
the individual to states or other institutional actors.38
Points to consider for epigenetic risk-predictive cancer 
screening
Implementation of epigenetic risk- predictive tests in population- 
based screening can only be morally acceptable by taking seri-
ously people’s varying health literacy, and social and economic 
situations.12 Personalised medicine is now primarily based on 
biological differences (differences on molecular, cellular and 
organ levels). But it should take into account people’s health 
literacy, and social and economic situation in order to be 
really personalised. Individuals differ in their ability to attain 
and maintain a healthy lifestyle. Moreover, individuals differ 
in their views on the good life, including the value of health. 
In our view, these ‘unique’ individual differences in social and 
economic status, in personal identity as well as values and views 
on the good life, have to be taken seriously. The above discus-
sion on personal responsibility gives rise to the following points 
to consider for a responsible implementation of epigenetic risk- 
predictive population- based screening programmes.
First, if people are to reap the benefits of such screening 
programmes, they must have the opportunity to change their 
behaviour in response to learning about an increased risk of 
disease. If the utility of the epigenetic risk- predictive test is 
proven, implementation is only warranted if offered with 
adequate support to make decisions and to adopt healthier life-
styles. This means that governments should invest in educational 
programmes to improve health literary skills across the popula-
tion and especially target the disadvantaged groups. However, 
the conditions that must be present to achieve a healthy lifestyle 
transcend the provision of education; people with a low socio-
economic status must also have the financial means, capacity 
and opportunity to acquire healthy food and achieve a healthy 
lifestyle.
Second, an adequate support system can only function prop-
erly if based on solid psychological research on the effects of 
personal risk information on people’s motivation to adjust their 
lifestyle, and on adequate support programmes to assist individ-
uals in changing their lifestyle.
Third, in order for a screening programme to redress the 
concerns about personal responsibility, the question about 
personal responsibility and the question about moral sanctions 
should be clearly distinguished. The question of responsibility 
is often directly linked to how people should be treated and 
whether people are still entitled to care or for reimbursement 
of care. These are, however, two different questions.36 Discus-
sions around screening for risks and the availability of preven-
tive measures often end up in this misunderstanding. Because 
some people do not want persons who are responsible to be 
blamed, or to pay a higher health insurance premium, they start 
arguing that those persons are not responsible (they could not do 
anything about it).ix But even if that was the case (ie, they could 
(have) do(ne) something about it), there are moral (solidarity) 
and practical reasons to abstain from moral sanctions.
Finally, if the validity of epigenetic risk- predictive tests is 
proven, implementation in population- based screening should 
start on a small scale by including, at first, a learning phase to 
develop the system gradually in an iterative way.
Since epigenetic screening will have a profound impact on 
participants, non- participants and the organisation of popula-
tion screening programmes, a responsible and sustaining imple-
mentation requires a careful and cautious approach with ample 
time to evaluate the technology and the experiences of partici-
pants of screening programmes as well as individuals who refuse 
or do not take part in screening, and to enable a public debate. 
This evaluation needs to pay special attention to the effects of 
implementing epigenetic screening in a society on the tendency 
within societies to hold individuals responsible for their health.
CONCLUSION
Given the special salience of epigenetic biomarkers, linking envi-
ronmental and lifestyle factors to individuals’ risks of cancer, the 
(future) introduction of epigenetics- based screening programmes 
raises questions regarding personal responsibility for health. 
It is not unimaginable that if epigenetic biomarkers allow for 
real- time monitoring of risk status and expose traceable rela-
tionships between lifestyle factors and disease risks, individuals 
will increasingly be held responsible for ill health and subject to 
moral sanctioning. To assess the justifiability of moral sanctions, 
however, the standard model of (retrospective or prospective) 
personal responsibility does not provide sufficient normative 
guidance. Other values, such as autonomy and society’s duty to 
relieve human suffering, will likely be more important. More-
over, institutional accounts of responsibility may be more suit-
able, as they reflect the presence of causal factors of ill health 
that may be beyond individual control. This paper offers some 
points to consider for those who will be involved in the setting 
up of epigenetics- based screening programmes in relation to 
personal responsibility.
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